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This thesis is about stochastic games and network games on graphs, more
specifically infinite two-person games played on finite graphs with imperfect
information. This thesis consists of two parts.
The first part treats determinacy (optimal value) and optimal (ε-optimal)
strategies in stochastic games. The main concern of this part is to give sim-
ple expressions of values of games and investigate the existence of optimal
(ε-optimal) strategies for each player in games of increasing Borel complex-
ity, namely a reachability, Büchi game, and etc. Moreover, we are interested
in the questions of what type of optimal (ε-optimal) strategy exists for each
player depending on the type of games. We first prove some basic facts on
a generalized version of reachability games, called generalized reachability
games. We describe the value of generalized reachability games as a limit
value of finite-step games. We also show that there exists a memoryless opti-
mal strategy of Player II in any generalized reachability games, while Player I
must settle for ε-optimality (memoryless). Intuitively, for a given finite play,
memoryless strategies give the next action depending on the current state
rather than the finite play itself. We next observe games with more complex
objectives, games with Büchi objectives. The results of generalized reacha-
bility games are used to show the value of Büchi games can be approximated
as values of some generalized reachability games. The proof includes the in-
formation on how we can construct ε-optimal strategies in a Büchi game for
a given positive real number ε. But we see that, in general, Player I may not
have a memoryless ε-optimal strategy in a Büchi game for some ε > 0, and
she is required the use of strategies with infinite memory indeed. However,
we think that Player II has a finite memory ε-optimal strategy in any Büchi
game. Informally, a finite memory strategy is a strategy which does not have
to remember all the history of the play, and therefore is allowed to forget
some information about the history of the play so far. In the final section
of this part, we introduce games with a Boolean combination of reachability
games. We first show that each player does not have a memoryless ε-optimal
strategy in this game for some ε > 0. We then prove that Player I and Player
ii
II have finite memory ε-optimal strategies for any ε > 0 in these games.
The second part is devoted to network games where our interests are
the existence and effective computability of Nash equilibria with respect to
graph properties. We model this game as a non-cooperative strategic game
on a graph, and analyze the characteristics of Nash equilibria [30], which is
a stable solution immune from unilateral deviation. In particular, we focus
on showing the existence of mixed Nash equilibria corresponding to graph
properties. We have considered various conditions for computing mixed Nash
equilibria. Informally, we view a network game as a game on an undirected
graph whose edges are exposed to virus infection disseminated by attackers,
and nodes can be protected by defenders, for instance, system security soft-
ware. In this model, attackers and defenders have opposing aims that seek
to maximize damage and protection on networks, respectively. This work
is continuous study of the network games introduced by Mavronicholas et
al. [26] and also motivated from the study by MedSalem et al. [29]. We
next generalize our network game to an asynchronous game, where two play-
ers repeatedly (unbounded many times) execute simultaneous games. The
asynchronous game can be viewed as a special Blackwell game [3]. Martin
proved that a Blackwell game with Borel payoff function is determinate, i.e.,
it has a stable solution [24]. Thus, our game with a suitable payoff is also
determinate, and each player has a stable strategy. However, we show this
by reducing it to a finite game without referring to Blackwell determinacy.
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In this chapter, we informally discuss the concepts of this thesis, a funda-
mental motivation and contributions of our study for those who simply want
to know what this thesis is about.
Chapter 2. Part I begins with Chapter 2, where we first give an intro-
duction of infinite games and then present some related works of stochastic
games for those who are unfamiliar with these games or game theory in gen-
eral.
Chapter 3. The third chapter is devoted to define the terminology of infi-
nite simultaneous stochastic games, strategies and values. We also introduce
some basic notions and descriptions of games that are necessary to under-
stand the arguments presented in sequent chapters.
Chapter 4. In this chapter, we study simultaneous stochastic games. We
first investigate a generalized reachability game. The main contributions and
results of this game are as follows.
• (Determinacy) We show that the generalized reachability game is de-
terminate in the sense that each player has an optimal value. Vervoort
[33] in proving the determinacy of Gδ Blackwell games, he first showed
determinacy of generalized open games. He proved the value of the
1
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game can be defined as a limit value for finite round games. Inspired
by his works, we give a simple expression of values to prove determi-
nacy of generalized reachability games by defining the notion of a limit
value of finite-step games.
• (Optimal strategies) We then show the existence of memoryless optimal
strategy of Player II in this game and prove the existence of a mem-
oryless ε-optimal strategy of Player I in any generalized reachability
games. The existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for simulta-
neous reachability games for all ε > 0, were shown in [18]. However, the
proof of this fact is rather complex. A more specialized result is shown
in [17] but again, the proof used deep results from analysis. Chatterjee
et al. [8] showed that the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies
can be established by a different way, where their proof relies on combi-
natorial techniques and using properties of a Markov decision process.
Thus, in this thesis, we provide a new proof to show the existence of
such strategies with a slightly different setting of [8].
To establish determinacy and optimal strategy are a fundamental first step
in study stochastic games, but it is also crucial for the utilization of payoff
functions. There are some Borel measurable payoff functions in which give
fundamental characteristics of plays. Over the infinite stochastic games on
graphs, typical payoff functions are limit-average (also called mean-payoff)
and discounted payoff. To know the definition of mean payoff functions, see
[18], [16], and [37]; for discounted payoff, see [18] and [13]. Besides their sim-
ple definitions, these two payoff functions enjoy the property that memoryless
optimal strategies always exist, especially in turn-based stochastic games. In
[5], they introduced a multi-mean payoff on a turn-based stochastic parity
game. Their work can be seen as an extension of [6] where mean-payoff parity
games have been studied. While Chatterjee et al. [7] defined another simple
payoff function, which contains both the limit-average and the discounted
sum functions in two-player turn-based games on a graph. Since there have
been many studies on mean payoffs and discounted payoffs, it seems reason-
able to work with another payoff function. It is interesting to study infinite
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simultaneous stochastic games that deploy some kind of payoff functions with
can capture more complicated properties.
• (Payoff functions) We define a labeling function in generalized reach-
ability games and it can be seen as a weighted reachability payoff.
Intuitively, such a function assigns to every infinite play either 0 if the
plays does not visit a target state, or the reward (positive real number)
of the first target state visited by the player. In contrast to reachability
game, a payoff function is defined by simply assign value 1 to any plays
that reach the target state, and value 0 otherwise.
We then turn to stochastic games with Büchi objectives. Actually, there are
many studies related to simultaneous stochastic games, especially in [16], [18],
and [15]. Chatterjee et al. [8] and De Alfaro & Majumdar [14] leading on this
line of researches where they intensively investigates simultaneous stochastic
games with reachability, safety, and Büchi winning objectives. However, all
those studies especially result presented in [14] is even rather complex, where
they introduced quantitative game µ-calculus. The game µ-calculus solutions
formulas also provide the value of Büchi games, that is, by characterize the
maximal probabilities of winning the game by a µ-calculus formula, and from
that formula, one can construct an optimal (ε-optimal) strategy.
Therefore, by following their series of studies, it seems reasonable for us
to present a natural framework to consider simultaneous stochastic Büchi
game and look at a different way on how to express the values of games.
So, in this thesis, we clarify the existence of the values of games in a more
specific way and investigate those games in comprehensive treatment. The
main results of the section are as follows.
• (Determinacy) We first prove determinacy of stochastic Büchi games.
Vervoort [33] showed determinacy of Gδ Blackwell games can be ap-
proximated by using some informations of generalized open games. Mo-
tivated by his works, we prove Büchi game is determinate by describing
its value as values of some generalized reachability games using our new
label function (weighted reachability payoff).
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We classifies a new strategy, called a finite memory strategy. Informally, a
finite memory strategy is a strategy which remembers a finite piece of the
history of the play.
• We prove in every Büchi games, there exist an ε-optimal finite memory
strategy of Player II for any ε > 0.
• We present a simple proof in showing the non-existence of ε-optimal
memoryless strategy of Player I in some Büchi games. We also show
there exists a Büchi game such that there is no ε-optimal finite memory
strategy of Player I for some ε > 0.
We introduce a new type of Büchi games called an approximation of Büchi
game. This kind of game is useful to treat the Büchi games.
• (Determinacy) We prove this game is determined and show its value
can be describe as a value of some generalized reachability games.
• (Optimal strategies) We provides various results concerning of type of
optimal strategies for each player in this game.
Final section introduce a new game, called Boolean games. We focus on
games with Boolean combinations of the reachability games and analyze an
optimal strategy of each player. We illustrates our results of this game as
follows.
• There exists a Boolean game and ε > 0, where each player does not
has ε-optimal memoryless strategy.
• In every games with Boolean combination of reachability games, there
exists an ε-optimal finite memory strategy of each player for any ε > 0.
Chapter 5. This chapter contains our formulation on network game as a
strategic graph-theoretic game. We first give a formal definition of network
games and define some basic notions of graph theory. The main question in
this study is the existence and effective computability of Nash equilibria.
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Mavronicholas et al. [26] started a line of research of network games, con-
cerning a strategic game on a graph with two confronting classes of players:
attackers who select vertices and want to minimize the probability of being
caught by the defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number
of attackers it catches. This game is a non-zero-sum stochastic games, where
the objectives of the (two or more) players are not necessarily conflicting.
In Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from
its (mixed) strategy. To the best of our knowledge, the network game of
Mavronicholas et al. [26] is the first strategic game where the network is
modeled as a non-cooperative player. In [29], a network game is generalized
to one with many defenders instead of a single player, so that there is a pure
Nash equilibrium in more general situations. Our contributions in this work
are as follows.
• We defined a new model with the roles of players interchanged [1].
• We provide a graph theoretic characterization of pure Nash equilibrium
of our new model.
Chapter 6. In this chapter, we investigate the existence conditions of a
mixed Nash equilibrium by applying some results in the previous chapter.
• We provided a characterization of a mixed Nash equilibrium with re-
spect to graph properties [2].
• We discuss various conditions for computing mixed Nash equilibria,
and particularly we work with games on bipartite graphs.
Chapter 7. In this chapter, we generalized the network game to a new game,
called an asynchronous game, where the players repeatedly make stochastic
moves [2]. Actually, the asynchronous games can be viewed as a special
Blackwell game. As we known, in the standard set theory, any Blackwell
game with a Borel payoff, the players have optimal strategy, and the game
is determinate. In our new game, each player also has a stable strategy by
using a suitable payoff function so that the game is determined.
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• We first prove one-round game is determinate. The proof follows from
a combination of the minimax theorem and Brouwers fixed point the-
orem.
• We next define a natural payoff function and then show the asyncronous
game is determined. We show this by reducing it to a finite game







In 1953, Gale and Stewart [19] introduced the theory of infinite games, called
Gale-Stewart games, which are two-player infinite games with perfect infor-
mation. The theory of Gale-Stewart games have been investigated by many
mathematicians and logicians, and until now, it is one of the major topics
in game theory and mathematical logic. This game is an infinite zero-sum
game with perfect information because one of the players always wins and
the other losses, and the game is played in turn. Usually, the format of Gale-
Stewart games is used where the two players strictly alternate, and in each
move a player selects an element of {0,1}. Gale-Stewart games can be viewed
as graph game, for instance on the infinite binary tree. By a celebrated the-
orem due to Martin [25], every game where the winning condition is given
by a Borel set is determined.
On the other hand, the determinacy for one-round simultaneous game
was proven by von Neumann [34] by using his famous minimax theorem.
Consequently, it follows that all games of finite length are determined and
have optimal strategies as well. Infinite version of von Neumann’s games were
introduced by David Blackwell [3]. In this game, the payoff is determined
by a Borel measurable function f on the set of possible resulting sequences
of moves. Blackwell himself [3] proved that all Gδ Blackwell games with
characteristic payoff functions are determined. Then, Orkin in [32] extends
8
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this result to Boolean combinations of Gδ game. In [24], Martin proved that
the determinacy of Blackwell games with Borel measurable payoff functions
follows from the known determinacy of perfect information games with Borel
payoff sets. The proof of Martin’s theorem is the culmination of a long series
of results proving the determinacy of games of increasing Borel hierarchy.
Now, we give a taxonomy of current research on stochastic games on
graphs, and present an overview of the existing results.
2.1 Turn-based Stochastic Games
In the usual format of infinite games on graphs, the possible moves of the
players are given by the edges of the graph; in each move a player takes the
token from its current position along an edge to a next position. Turn-based
stochastic games on graphs are infinite games of perfect information played
by two players and a random player. In particular, a turn-based stochastic
game is a directed graph with a finite or countably infinite set of states. The
states are partitioned into three players; either belongs to Player I, Player
II, or the random Player r.
An example of these games can be found in Kučera [23], where he dis-
cuss their basic properties, and present the existing results. We usually
called this game as a 21
2
-player game. The transitions of the random player
(Player r) choose randomly with respect to fixed probability distributions.
The transitions of the other states (Player I and Player II) are choose by
the respective player according to her or his strategy. Therefore, for a given
strategy for both players determines a play of the game. The aim of Player
I is to maximize the expected payoff, and the Player II aims to minimize it.
The turn-based deterministic games (or 2-player game) are the special case
of the 21
2
-player games without Player r.
Next, we try to summarize recent results about stochastic turn-based
games. We review results on determinacy of this game and optimal strategies
for both players.
In [22], Krcǎl studied the determinacy of stochastic turn-based games fo-
cused on some winning objectives. He mainly discussed reachability games
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and showed that the games are determined for both finite and infinite games.
In finite reachability games, both players have memoryless and deterministic
optimal strategies. In the case of infinite games with finite branching, only
Player II has an optimal strategy (memoryless and deterministic). In the
games with infinite branching, none of the players have an optimal strat-
egy in general. He also considered a safety game which is a dual game of
reachability games, and hence the results are dual to reachability case as
well. Beforehand, Condon [12] showed the existence of memoryless and de-
terministic optimal strategy in 21
2
-player games with reachability and safety
objectives.
Chatterjee et al. [4] established the decision problem for turn-based
stochastic game with Rabin, Streett, and Müller objectives. In [9] and [36],
they proved the existence of memoryless and deterministic optimality with
respect to parity objectives for any 21
2
-player turn-based games on graphs.
Then, Chatterjee et. al [10] showed for the case of Rabin objectives holds
for all 21
2
-player games. In particular, they proved the existence of optimal
strategy (memoryless and deterministic) for both players in any 21
2
-player
turn-based Rabin and Streett games. For the case of Müller objectives, he
again showed there exists an optimal strategy which is deterministic and
require a finite memory for a given 21
2
-player game graphs [11].
2.2 Simultaneous Stochastic Games
First, we give a brief explanation of these games. We consider two-player si-
multaneous games played on finite graphs. In this game, two-player chooses
a move at every state independently, each unaware of the choice of the other.
For each round of a game, Player I and Player II choose their actions simul-
taneously and then the next state is determined. A finite or infinite sequence
of states obtained is the result of a play. We are concern with the highest
expected value that Player I can achieve against any strategy of the oppo-
nent. Similarly, we also discuss the lowest expected value that the Player
II can achieve against any strategy of Player I. If these two quantities are
equal, we call them the value of the game and say the game is determined.
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An optimal strategy of Player I is a strategy that guarantees the value of
the game from each position. Finally, an ε-optimal strategy of Player I is a
strategy that satisfies the objective within an ε error of the value of the game
for some positive real ε. All games considered in this work can be regarded
as zero-sum games, and the reachability objective is one of the most basic
objectives among the Borel objectives. Although we know that for every
general class of games (i.e. Blackwell games), the determinacy and optimal
value results hold for all Borel objective [24], this thesis provides a specific
proof for simultaneous stochastic games and may give a deep intuitive under-
standing into this topic, especially games on graphs. In this part, we focus
our attention on three main questions:
1. Which games are determined (in the sense that from each position, the
player has an optimal value)?
2. In what circumstances can we express the values of games?
3. Are there optimal (ε-optimal) strategies, and if so, what is the type of
optimal (ε-optimal) strategy for each player?
We investigate a generalized reachability game, where the goal of Player
I is to force the plays to reach a specified set of target states with a higher
expected value, and the objective of the opponent is to prevent it. In a reach-
ability game, we assign value 1 to any plays that reach the target states, and
value 0 otherwise. However, in generalized reachability games, we define a
labeling function, and actually this is a weighted reachability payoff function
which assigns to every infinite play either 0 if any target state is not visited
in a play, or the reward (positive real number) of the first target state visited
by the players. We will give a formal definition of this game in the next
chapter
We also focus on Büchi games where the Player I want to visit target
states infinitely many times and the Player II want to prevent from reach-
ing the target states infinitely often. We describe values of Büchi games as
values of some generalized reachability games. The proof includes the in-
formation how we can construct ε-optimal strategies in a Büchi game for a
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given positive real number ε. But we see that, in general, Player I may not
have a memoryless ε-optimal strategy in a Büchi game for some positive real
ε. In study Büchi games, we define an n-th approximation of Büchi game.
Informally, in this game, Player I tries to visit the target states in at least
n many times and the opponent want to avoid it. This kind of game is very
useful to treat the properties of Büchi games itself. We first show this game
is determined by proving its value can be written as a value of generalized
reachability game induced by a labeling function with a domain target state.
We then analyze the optimal strategies of each player in similar manner.
Finally, we introduce a new game with Boolean combination of reachabil-
ity games. We first prove each player does not has a memoryless ε-optimal
strategy for some ε > 0. We then show that Player I and Player II have finite
memory ε-optimal strategies for any ε > 0 in any Boolean game generated
by reachability games.
Simultaneous stochastic games on graphs are more difficult to analyze
rather than turn-based games. For instance, in simultaneous games, optimal
strategies may not exist, but for every real ε > 0, there always exist a strategy
that guarantees a winning outcome with a probability that lies within ε of
the optimal value. There are still many challenging open problems in the
area of simultaneous stochastic games. Many of the fundamental results are
still waiting to be discovered in these games, especially their use of payoff
functions, as we mentioned earlier.
Chapter 3
Games
3.1 Definition of Stochastic Games
This chapter gives preliminaries that are necessary for understanding the ar-
guments presented in subsequent chapters. First, we give a formal definition
of game graph and simultaneous stochastic games.
Definition 3.1. A (two-player simultaneous) game graph is a quadruple
G = (S,AI, AII, δ), where
• S, AI and AII are nonempty finite sets,
• δ is a function from S × AI × AII into S.
Elements of S are called states. Elements of AI and AII are called actions of
Player I and Player II, respectively. δ is called a transition function.
A path or a play of a game G = (S,AI, AII, δ) is a finite or infinite sequence
s0s1s2... of states in S such that for all n ∈ N, there exist an ∈ AI and bn ∈ AII
where δ(sn, an, bn) = sn+1. Infinite paths of G are sometimes called runs. We
write Ω(G) for the set of infinite plays; and Ωfin(G) for the set of finite non-
empty plays. Sometimes we write Ω or Ωfin instead of Ω(G) or Ωfin(G) when
G is clear from the context.
Definition 3.2. Given a game graph G = (S,AI, AII, δ), a function F : Ω→
[0, 1] and a state s ∈ S. A stochastic game Gs(F ) with function F is an
13
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infinite (two-player) game of imperfect information played as follows: Player
I selects an element aI ∈ AI and simultaneously Player II chooses aII ∈ AII,
and the next state is determined. Then, the game proceeds to the next
round and so on. In this manner, they produce an infinite sequence of states
w = (s0s1...) such that δ(aI, aII, si) = si+1 for all i ∈ N. Finally, the Player
II pays the Player I the reward F (w), ending the game.
Intuitively, given a game graph G = (S,AI, AII, δ), a function F : Ω →
[0, 1] and a state s ∈ S, we consider the following infinite stochastic game
Gs(F ): at stage n ∈ N \ {0}, we have the finite part of a play w  n
with w(0) = s, and each player selects their actions aI ∈ AI and aII ∈
AII, simultaneously, and, then, the next state w(n) = δ(w(n − 1), aI, aII) is
determined. We assume that Player I wants to maximize F (w), whereas
Player II wants to minimize.
For a subset X of Ω(G), the infinite stochastic game Gs(X) is defined in
the same way considering X as its characteristic function. Thus, in the case
of a set X instead of a function F , Player I wants to put w into X, whereas
Player II wants to avoid it.
From now on, we use term game for both G and Gs(F ).
3.1.1 Strategies and expected values
The notion of strategies plays an important role in infinite games. Informally,
a strategy for a player in the game is a rule that specifies the next move of
the player for a given finite play.
For a set A, a probability distribution on A is a function µ : A → [0, 1]
with
∑
a∈A µ(a) = 1. We use D(A) for the set of all probability distributions
on A.
Mixed strategy
A mixed strategy is a rule chosen among the pure strategies in various pro-
portions (sometimes we call a randomized strategy). We formalize this notion
in the following definition.
CHAPTER 3. GAMES 15
Definition 3.3. Let G be a game. A mixed strategy of Player I in G is any
function
σ : Ωfin(G)→ D(AI).
We write ΣGI or ΣI for the set of strategies of Player I. Similary, a (mixed)
strategy of Player II in G is any function
τ : Ωfin(G)→ D(AII),
and we write ΣGII or ΣII for the set of all strategies of Player II.
Memoryless strategy
Intuitively, for a given finite play, memoryless strategies give the next action
depending on the current state rather than the finite play itself.
Definition 3.4. Let G be a game. A strategy σ of Player I is called memory-
less if σ(p) = σ(q) holds whenever p, q ∈ Ωfin(G) satisfy p(|p|−1) = q(|q|−1).
A memoryless strategy of Player II is defined similarly. We write ΣMI and Σ
M
II
for the set of all memoryless strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively.
Clearly, given a memoryless strategy σ ∈ ΣMI , there exists the function
σ′ : S → D(AI) such that σ(ps) = σ′(s) holds for any ps ∈ Ωfin(G) with
s ∈ S. We sometimes identify σ with σ′. Similar identification will be used
for Player II.
Finite memory strategy
Informally, a finite memory strategy is a strategy which remembers a finite
piece of the history of the play.
Definition 3.5. Let G be a game. A strategy σ of Player I is called of finite
memory if there exists a function Φ : Ωfin → Λ for some finite set Λ, and
for any p ∈ Ωfin, σ(p) = z(Φ(p))(p(|p| − 1)) for some function z : Λ→ ΣMI .
A finite memory strategy of Player II is defined similarly. We write ΣzI
and ΣzII for the set of all finite memory strategies of Player I and Player II,
respectively.
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In other words, the finite memory strategy is a rule constructed from a
combination of memoryless strategy.
Probability measure and expected values
A pair (σ, τ) ∈ ΣI × ΣII and a state s ∈ S determine a probability measure
P σ,τs on Ωs = {w ∈ Ω : w(0) = s} as follows.
Definition 3.6. Let G be a game. For a pair (σ, τ) ∈ ΣGI ×ΣGII of strategies
and a state s ∈ S, P σ,τs denotes the probability measure on Ωs determined
by






σ(p  n)(a)τ(p  n)(b)
for any p ∈ Ωfins = {q ∈ Ωfin : q(0) = s}, where [p] = {w ∈ Ω : p ⊂ w}.




exists, P σ,τs (F ) means the expected value of an infinite game Gs(F ) when
Player I and Player II use the strategies σ and τ , respectively. In the case of
a subset X of Ω instead of F , P σ,τs (X) means the probability that the infinite
play in Ωs belongs to X when Player I and Player II use the corresponding
strategies.
3.1.2 Values of games and optimal strategies
Let G be a game, and let F : Ω(G) → [0, 1] satisfy that P σ,τs (F ) exists
for any σ ∈ ΣGI , τ ∈ ΣGII and s ∈ S. We call such a function F a payoff
function of G. (In the game Gs(X), the set X with such a property is called
a winning set of G.) The value of Player I in a game Gs(F ) for a state s is
the supremum of expected value which Player I can ensure. Formally, it is
supσ∈ΣGI infτ∈ΣGII P
σ,τ
s (F ). Let ¬F be a function defined by ¬F (w) = 1−F (w).
The value of Player II is defined as supτ∈ΣGII infσ∈ΣGI P
σ,τ
s (¬F ). This value
is equal to 1 − infτ∈ΣGII supσ∈ΣGI P
σ,τ










P τ,σs (¬F ) = 1
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P σ,τs (F )
holds for any s ∈ S. In this case, we write valGs (F ) or vals(F ) instead of
supσ∈ΣGI infτ∈ΣGII P
σ,τ
s (F ), and call it the value at s in the game Gs(F ).
The following is well-known theorem obtained by Martin.
Theorem 3.1 (Martin [24]). Let G be a game and let F : Ω(G) → [0, 1] a
Borel measurable function. Then the game G(F ) is determinate.
Definition 3.7. Let G be a game, F : Ω → [0, 1] and ε ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose




P σ,τs (F ) ≥ vals(F )− ε
holds for any s ∈ S. Similarly, a strategy τ ∈ ΣII of Player II is ε-optimal if
sup
σ∈ΣGI
P σ,τs (F ) ≤ vals(F ) + ε
holds for any s ∈ S. Optimal strategies are 0-optimal strategies.
By the definitions, a strategy σ ∈ ΣI of Player I is optimal if and only if
inf
τ∈ΣII
P σ,τs (F ) = vals(F )
holds for all s ∈ S, and τ ∈ ΣII is optimal if and only if
sup
σ∈ΣI
P σ,τs (F ) = vals(F )
holds for all s ∈ S.
When Gs(F ) is determinate and ε is a positive real number, then ε-
optimal strategies of Player I and Player II always exist by the definition.
However, there are some cases that Player I or Player II has no optimal
strategy.
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Definition 3.8 (One-step games). Let G be a game and let V : S → [0, 1].
We define FV : Ωs(G)→ [0, 1] by
FV (w) = V (w(1)).
Games of the form Gs(FV ) are called one-step games.
We write Gs(V ) meaning Gs(FV ), and we write vals(V ) for s ∈ S instead
of vals(FV ). In one-step games, the optimal strategies always exist for each
player. This theorem is well-known as von Neumann’s minimax theorem.




4.1 Generalized Reachability Games
Reachability games are in some respect the simplest infinite games. We will
prove some basic facts on a generalized version of reachability games, called
generalized reachability games. We will describe the value of reachability
games as a limit value of finite-step games. We will see that Player II has
a memoryless optimal strategy, and Player I has a memoryless ε-optimal
strategy in any generalized reachability games for any positive real number
ε. Nevertheless, in general it is known that, even in a reachability game,
Player I may not have an optimal strategy.
4.1.1 Labeling function and payoff function
Definition 4.1. Let G be a game. A function ` is called a label on S if
dom(`) ⊂ S and `(s) ∈ [0, 1] for any s ∈ dom(`).
Definition 4.2. Let G be a game and let ` a label on S. We define a payoff
function RG,` : Ω(G)→ [0, 1] associated to label ` by
RG,`(w) =
`(w(Nw)) if (∃N ∈ N)[w(N) ∈ dom(`)],0 otherwise,
where Nw is the least natural number N such that w(N) ∈ dom(`).
19
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Definition 4.3. A game of the form G(RG,`) is called a generalized reacha-
bility game.
For a subset T of S, let RG,T = RG,`T , where `T : T → {1}. Games of
the form G(RG,T ) are called reachability games.
Firstly, we analyze the n-step game in which Player I wants to reach the
target state with higher expected value up to n steps. By this way, we can
find the n-step value and this value is useful to treat the infinite games. For
instance, if we take the probability of winning in one step, and the probability
of winning in two steps and so on, we will get a non-decreasing sequences of
value and this sequence has a limit. Note that the infinite games have the
maximal probability in unlimited steps. For this purpose, we define a limit
value as follows.
Definition 4.4. Let G be a game and let ` a label on S. For every state
s ∈ S and n ∈ N, we define V G,`n : S → [0, 1] inductively by
V G,`0 (s) =
`(s) if s ∈ dom(`),0 otherwise,
V G,`n+1(s) =
`(s) if s ∈ dom(`),vals(V G,`n ) otherwise.
We let V G,`(s) = limn→∞ V
G,`
n (s) for any state s, and we call it the limit value
at s.
Definition 4.5. Let G be a game. For a label ` on S and n ∈ N, we define
RG,`n : Ω(G)→ [0, 1] by
RG,`n (w) =
`(w(Nw)) if ∃m ≤ n with w(m) ∈ dom(`),0 otherwise.
A game of the form G(RG,`n ) is called a finite (or n-step) generalized reacha-
bility game.
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Theorem 4.1. For any n ∈ N, both players have their optimal strategies in
the game G(RG,`n ), and the equality V G,`n (s) = vals(RG,`n ) holds for all s ∈ S.
Proof. We define σ∗n and τ
∗




0 be any strategies.
Now suppose that we have constructed σ∗n and τ
∗
n. Choose σ and τ as optimal
strategies of Player I and II respectively in the one-step game G(V G,`n ). Define
σ∗n+1 by σ
∗




n(ρ) for any s ∈ S and any ρ 6= ∅
with sρ ∈ Ωfin. Similarly, define τ ∗n+1 by τ ∗n+1(s) = τ(s) and τ ∗n+1(sρ) = τ ∗n(ρ)
for any s ∈ S and any ρ 6= ∅ with sρ ∈ Ωfin. It is easy to see by induction on
n that σ∗n+1 and τ
∗
n+1 satisfy the equalities V
G,`





s (RG,`n+1). This equalities imply that the σ∗n+1 and τ ∗n+1 are optimal





4.1.2 Determinacy and optimal strategies
Now we verify the value vals(RG,`) is equivalent to the limit value V G,`(s).
Theorem 4.2. For any state s ∈ S, the equation V G,`(s) = vals(RG,`) holds.










To show the first inequality, choose an optimal strategy τ ∗ of Player II in
the one-step game Gs(V G,`) for any s ∈ S. We may see τ ∗ as a memoryless
strategy of Player II in the generalized reachability game G(RG,`). We show
that τ ∗ satisfies the inequality supσ∈ΣI P
σ,τ∗
s (RG,`) ≤ V G,`(s) for any s ∈ S.
(Thus, if we prove the second inequality, then we can say this τ ∗ is, in fact,
an optimal strategy of Player II in the game G(RG,`).) It is enough to show
that supσ P
σ,τ∗
s (RG,`n ) ≤ V G,`(s) for any s ∈ S and n ∈ N. We show this by
induction on n. The case n = 0 is clear. Suppose that supσ P
σ,τ∗
s (RG,`n ) ≤
V G,`(s) holds for any s ∈ S as an induction hypothesis. Fix s ∈ S. If
s ∈ dom(`), then it is obvious that the inequality holds for s. Otherwise, we

















for any σ ∈ ΣI, where σs(ρ) = σ(sρ) for all ρ ∈ Ωfin. By the induction


























′])V G,`(s′) = V G,`(s)
hold by the optimality of τ ∗ in the one-step game. Let us now show the
second inequality. We have
P σ,τs (RG,`n ) ≤ P σ,τs (RG,`)










holds. By Theorem 4.1,




P σ,τs (RG,`n )
holds. Thus, the second inequality holds.
Corollary 4.3. Player II has a memoryless optimal strategy in any gener-
alized reachability game.
Contrary to the case of Player II, Player I has no optimal strategy in
some reachability games. We give such an example below.
Example 1. Consider the following game as shown in Figure 1. Let S =
{s0, s1, s2}, AI = {x1, x2} and AII = {y1, y2}. Define a transition function δ
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by
δ(s0, x1, y1) = s0; δ(s0, x2, y2) = s2,
δ(s0, x1, y2) = δ(s0, x2, y1) = s1, and
δ(si, x, y) = si
for any i ∈ {1, 2} and (x, y) ∈ AI × AII.
Fig. 1. An illustration of reachability game
Now consider the reachability game G(RG,T ) with the target state T = {s1}.
One can prove that vals0(RG,{s1}) = 1. We show that Player I has no optimal
strategy in the reachability game G(RG,{s1}).
Proof. Fix a strategy σ ∈ ΣI. We construct τ ∈ ΣII such that P σ,τs0 (R
G,{s1}) <
1. For a finite play ρ ∈ Ωfin(G), define τ(ρ)(y1) = 1 if σ(ρ)(x1) = 1, and
define τ(ρ)(y2) = 1 otherwise. It is clear that P
σ,τ
s0
(RG,{s1}) < 1 by the
definitions of G and τ .
The next theorem says that, given a generalized reachability game, Player
I always has a memoryless ε-optimal strategy in this game for any positive
real number ε. In fact, this result for reachability games was shown by
Chatterjee et al. [8] in a slightly different setting. We essentially use their
method to prove our theorem.
Theorem 4.4. In every generalized reachability game G(RG,`), there exists
an ε-optimal memoryless strategy of Player I for any ε > 0.
Proof. Let G be a game and let ` a label on S. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that if s ∈ dom(`) or vals(RG,`) = 0, then δ(s, x, y) = s
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holds for any (x, y) ∈ AI × AII. Fix a positive real ε > 0. Choose n ∈ N
such that for any s ∈ S, the inequality V G,`n−1(s) ≥ vals(RG,`) − ε holds, and
vals(RG,`) > 0 implies V G,`n−1(s) > 0. For m ≤ n, choose σm ∈ ΣMI such that
σm is an optimal strategy of Player I in the one-step game G(V G,`m−1). We
define a strategy σ∗ ∈ ΣMI by σ∗(s) = σms(s) for any s ∈ S, where ms is the
least number m ≤ n such that V G,`m (s) = V G,`n (s). By the definition,







holds for any s ∈ S \ dom(`). Now choose a strategy τ ∗ ∈ ΣMII such that
P σ
∗,τ∗





for all s ∈ S.
Fix a s ∈ S \dom(`) with V G,`ms (s) > 0. Suppose that Vn(s) ≥ Vn(s
′) holds
for any s′ ∈ S with P σ∗,τ∗s ([ss′]) > 0. We have
V G,`ms (s) = V
G,`
ms−1(s
′) = V G,`n (s
′)
for any s′ ∈ S with P σ∗,τ∗s ([ss′]) > 0 since










hold. Therefore, if s′ ∈ S satisfies P σ∗,τ∗s ([ss′]) > 0, then ms > ms−1. As a
result, we know that for any s ∈ S\dom(`) there exists s′ with P σ∗,τ∗s ([ss′]) >
0 such that
V G,`n (s) < V
G,`
n (s
′) or ms > ms−1.
Note that {V G,`n (s) : s ∈ S \dom(`)} is finite, and ms = 0 implies s ∈ dom(`)
or V G,`n (s) = 0. Here V
G,`
n (s) = 0 implies vals(RG,`) = 0. Hence for any s ∈ S
there exists ρ ∈ Ωfins such that
P σ
∗,τ∗
s ([ρ]) > 0 and ρ(|ρ| − 1) ∈ dom(`) or valρ(|ρ|−1)(RG,`) = 0.
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As a conclusion, we have P σ
∗,τ∗
s (A) = 0 for any s ∈ S, where
A = {w ∈ Ω : (∀n ∈ N)[w(n) ∈ dom(`) & valw(n)(RG,`) > 0]}.
Thus, the sum∑{
V G,`n (ρ(|ρ| − 1))P σ
∗,τ∗
s ([ρ]) : ρ ∈ Ωfins & |ρ| = k
}
tends to P σ
∗,τ∗
s (RG,`) as k to∞. It is easy to see by induction on k ∈ N that∑{
V G,`n (ρ(|ρ| − 1))P σ
∗,τ∗
s ([ρ]) : ρ ∈ Ωfins & |ρ| = k
}
≥ V G,`n−1(s)
holds for any k ∈ N.
Hence we have P σ
∗,τ∗
s (RG,`) ≥ V
G,`
n−1(s) ≥ vals(RG,`)− ε.
4.2 Büchi Games
Our plan in this section is as follows. After giving the definition of Büchi
games, we describe values of Büchi games as values of some generalized reach-
ability games. The proof includes the information how we can construct ε-
optimal strategies in a Büchi game for a given positive real number ε. But we
see that, in general, Player I may not have a memoryless ε-optimal strategy
in a Büchi game for some positive real ε.
4.2.1 Definition of Büchi games
Let G be a game. For a run w ∈ Ω(G), we define
Inf(w) = {s ∈ S : (∀n ∈ N)(∃m ≥ n)[w(m) = s]}
as the set of state s appears in the run w infinitely often. For T ⊂ S, we set
BG,T = {w ∈ Ω(G) : Inf(w) ∩ T 6= ∅},
be the set of run passes through infinitely many members of T .
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Definition 4.6. Any game of the form G(BG,T ) is called a stochastic Büchi
game. T is called the set of target states of the Büchi game G(BG,T ).
De Alfaro and Majumdar [14] showed that the maximal probability of
winning for a Büchi game can be expressed as a fixpoint formulas by intro-
ducing quantitative game µ-calculus. In particular, they characterized the
optimality and the memory requirements of the winning strategies, that is,
memoryless strategies suffice for winning games with reachability condition,
and Büchi conditions require the use of strategies with infinite memory.
Definition 4.7. Let G be a game. For a label ` on S, we define a function
RG,`+ : Ω(G)→ [0, 1] by
RG,`+ (w) =
`(w(Nw)) if (∃N > 0)[w(N) ∈ dom(`)],0 otherwise,
where Nw is the least natural number N > 0 such that w(N) ∈ dom(`).
We also call this type of games generalized reachability games. Clearly,
the results for generalized reachability games in the previous section hold
even for games of the form G(RG,`+ ). To study Büchi games, these results for
games G(RG,`+ ) are useful.
Definition 4.8. Let G be a game and let T ⊂ S. For any n ∈ N, we define
a label `G,Tn on S with the domain T inductively by





We set `G,T (s) = limn→∞ `
G,T
n (s).
4.2.2 Determinacy and optimal strategies
For T ⊂ S and n ∈ N, we define BG,Tn = {w ∈ Ω(G) : (∃≥nk > 0)[w(k) ∈ T ]}.
Here, read “∃≥nk > 0” as “there exist at least n-many natural numbers
k > 0”. We may called game G(BG,Tn ) as an n-th approximation Büchi game.
It is easy to check such a game is determinate as following theorem shows.
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+ ) holds for any n ∈ N
and any s ∈ S.
Proof. Let `n = `
G,T
n for any n ∈ N. We show the equality holds by induction
on n. Fix n. It is clear that the equation holds for any s ∈ S when n = 0.
Now, suppose that vals(BG,Tn+1) = vals(R
G,`n
+ ) holds for any s ∈ S. Then
we have `n+1(s) = vals(RG,`n+ ) = vals(B
G,T
n+1) for any s ∈ T = dom(`n+1).
Therefore, vals(BG,Tn+2) = vals(R
G,`n+1
+ ) holds for any s ∈ S.
Now, we prove one of our main theorem in this section. We show that the
values of Büchi games can be written as values of some generalized reacha-
bility games.
Theorem 4.6. The equality valGs (BG,T ) = valGs (R
G,`G,T
+ ) holds for any s ∈ S.
Proof. Let ` = `G,T and `n = `
G,T






P σ,τs (BG,T ) ≤ vals(R
G,`




P σ,τs (BG,T ).










holds for any n ∈ N. Since the righthand tends to vals(RG,`+ ) as n to ∞, we
know that the first inequality holds. Let us now show the second inequality
also holds.
Fix a positive real ε. We construct a strategy σ∗ ∈ ΣI such that





holds for any s ∈ S. Choose sequences {αn}n∈N, {βn}n∈N of positive reals
such that




vals(RG,`)(1− αn) ≤ vals(RG,`)− βn
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINACY 28
holds for any s ∈ S and n ∈ N. Choose a sequence {σn}n∈N of strategies of
Player I in the game G(RG,`) such that σn is βn-optimal for any n ∈ N. For
k ∈ N, we define σ∗k ∈ ΣI as follows: for ρ ∈ Ωfin, let
σ∗k(ρ) = σn+k(ρsuf),
where ρsuf ∈ Ωfin(G) satisfies ρ = (ρ  m)ρsuf with m = max{0, i− 1 : ρ(i) ∈









s (BG,Tn ) (4.1)
holds for any s ∈ S and k, n ∈ N. Fix n ∈ N. Clearly (4.1) holds for any
s ∈ S and k ∈ N when n = 0. Now, suppose that n satisfies (4.1) for any
s ∈ S and k ∈ N. For s, s′ ∈ S, define a following set



































holds for any s ∈ S and k ∈ N. Thus (4.1) holds for any s ∈ S and k, n ∈ N.
Hence,






holds for any s ∈ S and n ∈ N. Since BG,T =
⋂
n∈N BG,Tn holds, we have
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for any s ∈ S.
The following example shows that there exist a positive real ε and a Büchi
game in which Player I has no ε-optimal memoryless strategy.
Example 2. Let G = (S,AI, AII, δ) be a game given as Figure 3, where
S = {s0, s1, s2}, AI = {x1, x2} and AII = {y1, y2}. The transition function δ
is given by
δ(s0, x1, y1) = s0; δ(s0, x2, y2) = s2,
δ(s0, x1, y2) = δ(s0, x2, y1) = s1,
δ(s1, x, y) = s0, and δ(s2, x, y) = s2
for all (x, y) ∈ AI × AII. Define T = {s1}.
Fig. 3. An illustration of Büchi game
One can prove that vals0(BG,T ) = 1. We show that Player I has no ε-
optimal memoryless strategy in the Büchi game G(BG,T ) for any positive real
ε < 1.
Proof. Fix a positive real ε < 1 and a strategy σ ∈ ΣMI . We define a strategy
τ ∈ ΣII by τ(ρ)(y1) = 1 if σ(ρ)(x1) = 1, and τ(ρ)(y2) = 1 otherwise. In
the case that σ(s0)(x1) = 1, we have P
σ,τ
s0
({sN0 }) = 1. Otherwise, we have
P σ,τs0 (R




(BG,{s1}) = 0 < 1− ε = vals0(BG,T )− ε holds.
Theorem 4.7. There exists a Büchi game and ε > 0 such that there is no
ε-optimal finite memory strategy of Player I.
Proof. By analyzing an Example 2, we can show the theorem holds.
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Now, we analyze the strategies in game G(BG,Tn ). We first show that
Player II has an ε-optimal finite memory strategy in game G(BG,Tn ) for a
given positive reals ε as the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8. Let G be a stochastic game with objective BG,Tn associated to
a set of target states T . Then, there exists an optimal finite memory strategy
of Player II.
Proof. We know that by Corollary 4.3, Player II has a memoryless optimal
strategy in any generalized reachability games G(RG,`). Define τi as an opti-
mal memoryless strategy in G(RG,`i+ ) for any i < n. Thus, from the definition
of finite memory strategy, we have Λ = {0, 1, ..., n − 1} and Φ : Ωfin → Λ is
defined by Φ(p) = max{0, n−1−mp} where mp is the number of occurrences
of target states in p. We set a function z : Λ → ΣMII as z(k) = τk where τk
is a finite memory strategy of Player II. Finally, we define a finite memory
strategy τ of Player II by τ(p) = z(Φ(p))(p(|p| − 1)).
To show such a strategy is optimal, for s, s′ ∈ S, let As,s′ be the set as
defined in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Take σ ∈ ΣI arbitrarily. Then, the
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The following example shows that there exist a positive real ε and a n-th
approximation Büchi game in which Player I has no ε-optimal memoryless
strategy.
Example 3. Obverse that G = (S,AI, AII, δ) be a game as given in Figure 2.
The set of state S is given by S = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}. Set of actions for Player
I and Player II are given by AI = {x1, x2, x3} and AII = {y1, y2}, respectively,
and the transition function δ is defined by
δ(s0, x1, y1) = δ(s0, x2, y2) = s1,
δ(s0, x1, y2) = δ(s0, x2, y1) = s2,
δ(s0, x3, y1) = δ(s0, x3, y2) = s3,
δ(s1, x, y) = s1; δ(s2, x, y) = s0; δ(s3, x, y) = s4 and δ(s4, x, y) = s4
for all (x, y) ∈ AI × AII. Define T = {s2, s3}.
Fig. 2. An illustration of n-th approximation Büchi game
Now we prove for some ε > 0, there exists a game G(BG,Tn ) such that Player
I has no ε-optimal memoryless strategy.
Proof. Let us consider the case n = 2, that is, Player I wants to visit the
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A strategy σ ∈ ΣMI is defined as follows. Without lost of generality, let
σ(s0)(x1) = σ(s0)(x2) = α; and σ(s0)(x3) = β. Note that 2α + β = 1.
Hence, the expected probability that the play enters into the given set T is







, that is, the maximum expected value when Player I uses
a memoryless strategy. Thus, infτ P
σ,τ
s0




Next, we show the existence of ε-optimal finite memory strategy of Player
II in every Büchi games.
Theorem 4.9. There exists an ε-optimal finite memory strategy of Player
II for any ε > 0 in any Büchi game G(BG,T ).
Proof. Note that in any generalized reachability games, Player II always has
an ε-optimal memoryless strategy (indeed optimal memoryless strategy) for
some real ε < 1. For a given ε > 0, if we consider a large enough n ∈ N in
game G(BG,Tn ), then we have an optimal finite memory strategy of Player II
(as shown in Theorem 4.8). The value of game G(BG,Tn ) is converges to the
value of Büchi game G(BG,T ). Therefore, Player II has an ε-optimal finite
memory strategy in G(BG,T ).
The final result in this section shows the existence of ε-optimal strategy
(finite memory) of Player I in any n-th approximation Büchi game. In Theo-
rem 4.9, for any Büchi game and every positive real ε, Player I seems to also
has an ε-optimal finite memory strategy by the same reason of the existence
of the one of Player II, providing that the next theorem is true.
Theorem 4.10. Let G(BG,Tn ) be an n-th approximation of Büchi game. Then
Player I has ε-optimal finite memory strategy for any ε > 0.
Proof. The proof essentially follows from the proof of Theorem 4.9.
4.3 Boolean Games
This section is devoted to investigate the game with a Boolean combination
of reachability games. Similar questions arise from the motivation. In partic-
ular, for a given Boolean game G and a state s, is this game determined?; can
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we clarify the values of games in some way and find an optimal strategy (if
one exists) for a given player from a given state? Our main result in this sec-
tion shows that for some ε > 0, there is no ε-optimal memoryless strategy for
each player in some game with a Boolean combination of reachability games.
In fact, we prove that in every game with Boolean combination of reachabil-
ity games and for any positive real number ε, there exists an ε-optimal finite
memory strategy for each player.
4.3.1 Definition of game and strategies
We begin our formal discussion with the following definition. Fix a game
graph G, and let BOOL ⊂ Pow(Ω) be the smallest class such that RG,T ⊂
BOOL for any T ⊂ S, and that BOOL is closed under the set-theoretic
operations of union, intersection and complementation.
Definition 4.9. Any game of the form G(A), A ∈ BOOL, is called a Boolean
game.
As we mentioned in the earlier chapters, all strategic considerations must
be defined in a precise way so that it includes all information about the
situations of the game. So, for the case of Boolean games, we have to define
a special definition of finite memory strategy. The definition can be seen as
a stronger version than the definition of finite memory strategy for Büchi
games.
Definition 4.10. Let G(A) be a Boolean game. A strategy σ of Player I is
called finite memory if there exists a function z : Pow(S) → ΣMI such that
for any play p ∈ Ωfin, σ(p) = z(Set(p))(p(|p| − 1)), where Set(p) = {s ∈
S : ∃k < |p|, p(k) = s}. A finite memory strategy of Player II is defined
similarly. We write ΣzI and Σ
z
II for the set of all finite memory strategies of
Player I and Player II, respectively.
Remark 1. In the rest of Section 4.3, we only use the term finite memory
as the concept for Boolean games.
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4.3.2 Determinacy and optimal strategies
In this section, we first define the following set of winning plays for Player I
and then analyze the strategies for the games with Boolean combinations of
the RG,T ’s.







where SG,S\Ti,n+1 = ¬RG,Ti,n+1 .
Proof. The proof follows by showing that the equations are closed under
union, intersection and negation.
Theorem 4.12. There exists a set B ∈ BOOL such that for some ε > 0,
there is no ε-optimal memoryless strategy of Player I in G(B).
Proof. We prove this theorem by giving an example as in Figure 4. Our
proof will be informal but rigorous enough. Obverse that G(B) be a game
with a Boolean combination of reachability games, where S = {s0, s1, s2, s3},
AI = {x1, x2, x3} and AII = {y1, y2}, and the transition function δ is given
by
δ(s0, x1, y1) = δ(s0, x2, y2) = s1,
δ(s0, x1, y2) = δ(s0, x2, y1) = s2,
δ(s0, x3, y1) = δ(s0, x3, y2) = s3,
δ(s1, x, y) = s1; δ(s2, x, y) = s0 and δ(s3, x, y) = s3
for all (x, y) ∈ AI ×AII. Define B = (RG,T ∩ ¬RG,S\T
′
) where T = {s2} and
T ′ = {s0, s2, s3}.
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Fig. 4. An illustration of the game
Fix ε < 1. One can show that valGs0(B) =
1
2
. A strategy σ ∈ ΣMI is defined as
follows. Without lost of generality, we assume that σ(s0)(x1) = σ(s0)(x2) = α
and σ(s0)(x3) = β. Thus, the expected probability that the play enters into
the given setB is (α+α2+α3+...)β. Let denote this value as f(α). It is known








) = 3− 2
√
2 which








, which proved the theorem.
Theorem 4.13. For some ε > 0, there is no ε-optimal memoryless strategy
of Player II in G(B).
Proof. By observing the complement of the game presented in the above
proof, we can show in similar way for the case of Player II, and hence the
theorem is holds.
Theorem 4.14. In every games with a Boolean combination of reachability
games and for any ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal finite memory of each
player.













for some sequence {Ti,j}i,j≤n of subsets of S. Define a game G′ = (S ′, AI, AII, δ′)
as S ′ = {(s, T ) : s ∈ T ⊂ S} and δ′((s, T ), a, b) = (δ(s, a, b), T ∪ {δ(s, a, b)})
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It is clear that the equality




holds for any s ∈ S. Moreover, there is a bijective translation from any finite
memory strategy of each player in the game G to a memoryless strategy
of the corresponding player in the game G′ conserving the value of their
strategy. Thus, to show the existence of a finite memory ε-optimal strategy
of each player in the game G(B) for any positive real ε, it is enough to see
the existence of a memoryless ε-optimal strategy of each player in the game
G′(B′) for any positive real ε.
We show this by backward induction on the cardinality of T for a state
(s, T ) ∈ S ′. Fix (s, T ) ∈ S ′. As an inductive hypothesis, we suppose that
for any positive real ε, there exists a memoryless ε-optimal strategy of any
player in the game G′(B′) restricted to {(t, U) ∈ S ′ : #U > #T} as its set
of states. We have two cases.
• (Case 1) For any i ≤ n, if T intersects with Ti,j for all j < n, then
T also intersects with Ti,n. Consider a play with the starting point
(s, T ) in the game G′(B′). If the play stays {(t′, T ) : t′ ∈ T}, then the
Player I loses. If the play reaches some state of the form (t, T ∪ {t})












for any t ∈ T , where `(s,T ) is a label on S ′ such that
dom(`(s,T )) = {(t, T ∪ {t}) : t ∈ S \ T}
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and




for any t with (t, T ∪ {t}) ∈ dom(`(s,T )). Given a positive real number
ε, a memoryless ε-optimal strategy of a player in the game G′(B′) re-
stricted to {(t, U) ∈ S ′ : #U ≥ #T} is obtained as the combination of
a memoryless β-optimal strategy of the player in the generalized reach-
ability game G′(RG′,`(s,T )) and a memoryless β′-optimal strategy of the
player in the Boolean game G′(B′) restricted to {(t, U) ∈ S ′ : #U ≥
#T} for some positive small-enough real numbers β, β′.
• (Case 2) For some i ≤ n, T intersects with Ti,j for all j < n and
T ∩ Ti,n has the empty intersection. Consider a play with the starting
point (s, T ) in the game G′(B′). If the play stays {(t′, T ) : t′ ∈ T},
then the Player II loses. If the play reaches some state of the form
(t, T ∪ {t}) with t ∈ S \ T , then from that state, the Player II can win




′) = 1− valG′(t,T )(RG
′,`(s,T ))
for any t ∈ T , where `(s,T ) is a label on S ′ such that
dom(`(s,T )) = {(t, T ∪ {t}) : t ∈ S \ T}
and




for any t with (t, T ∪{t}) ∈ dom(`(s,T )). Just like Case 1, we know that
for any positive real number ε, there exists a memoryless ε-optimal








Game theory provides highly abstract tools which help us to represent and
analyze interactive situations. Their abstraction allows us to apply them
across disciplines, from set theory and logic to economic and biology. The
most important notion in this approach is a Nash equilibrium which rep-
resents a situation where no player has anything to gain by changing his
strategy unilaterally [30, 31].
In this chapter, we consider a network security problem concerning the
protection of a network from harmful entities. It is said that the more widely
networks grows, the more vulnerable they become to security risks. Thus,
the challenge is to invent a proper theoretical model for understanding the
mathematical aspects of network security. We formulate a network security
problem as a strategic graph-theoretic game and study its associated Nash
equilibria. More specifically, we view a network as an undirected graph whose
edges are exposed to virus infection disseminated by attackers, and nodes
can be protected, for instance, by a system security software. In this model,
attackers and defenders over the network security have oposing aims that
seek to maximize damage and protection, respectively. An attacked edge is
destroyed unless one of its end nodes is protected by the security software.
39
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5.2 Motivations and Related Works
Mavronicholas et al. [26] started a line of research of network games, that is,
strategic games on graphs with two types of players, attackers and a defender.
Attackers attack a node of the network to damage, and a defender is to
protect the network by catching attackers in some part of the network. Each
attacker wishes to maximize the number of successful (uncatched) attacks,
whereas the defender aims at maximizing the number of attackers it catches.
Mavronicolas et al. [26] first showed that no game with the defender playing
a single edge (the Edge model) has a pure Nash equilibrium unless it is a
trivial graph (see Theorem 4.3, [26]). They also defined a subclass of mixed
Nash equilibria, called matching Nash equilibria, which are solvable in non-
deterministic polynomial time for graphs with certain conditions (Theorem
5.3, [26]). Finally, they improved this non-deterministic algorithm into a
deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for a bipartite graph (Theorem 6.3,
[26]).
In [20], they considered a more general game, where the defender is able
to scan a set of k links of the network. First, they showed that the exis-
tence problem of pure Nash equilibria is solvable in polynomial time. Then,
they provided a graph-theoretic characterization of mixed Nash equilibria.
Motivated by a class of polynomial time Nash equilibria, introduced for the
Edge model, they defined a k-matching profile that generalizes a match-
ing profile, and presented a polynomial time reduction for transforming any
matching Nash equilibria of any instance of the Edge model to a k-matching
Nash equilibria on a correspondence instance of their new model, and hence
provided a characterization of graphs admitting k-matching Nash equilibria.
Their model has been further studied in [27] and [28]. Especially, it models a
risk scenario for a synchronous issue of network attacks and a limited power
security mechanism.
Following their series of studies, we propose a new network game where
attackers aim to damage the network by attacking an edge, and defenders
aim to protect the network by securing a vertex. Both the attackers and
defenders make individual (but simultaneous) decisions for their placements
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCING NETWORK GAMES 41
in the network, seeking to maximize their objectives. The defenders seek
to protect the network as much as possible, while each attacker wishes to
avoid being caught so as to be able to damage the network. Our work is also
motivated from the study by MedSalem et al. [29]. They establish that the
increased number of the defender results in better protection of the network.
Their work can be seen as a generalization of [26] where the games with many
non-centralized defenders are investigated in terms of the complexity of pure
Nash equilibria.
5.3 Definition of Network Games
We start by introducing some basic concepts of graph theory which are nec-
essary to understand in subsequent sections.
5.3.1 Basic notions of graph theory
We consider an undirected graph G = (V,E) where V denotes a set of vertices
and E denotes a set of edges. If v is adjacent to an edge e, then we write
v ∈ e.
Definition 5.1. A vertex cover of G is a vertex set CV ⊆ V such that for
each edge e ∈ E, there is a v ∈ CV where v ∈ e. A minimum vertex cover is
one that has the minimum size.
Definition 5.2. An edge cover of G is an edge set CE ⊆ E such that ∀v ∈
V, ∃e ∈ CE, v ∈ e.
Definition 5.3. A matching M of G is a subset of E such that no vertex is
incident to more than one edge in M .
That is, no two edges in M have a common vertex. The two ends of an
edge in M are said to be matched under M . A matching M is said to be
maximum if for any other matching M ′, |M | ≥ |M ′|.
Definition 5.4. A vertex set IV ⊆ V is an independent set of G if for all
pairs of vertices u, v ∈ IV , (u, v) /∈ E.
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Given Ē ⊂ E and V̄ ⊂ V , define a set V (Ē) = {v ∈ V : v ∈ e for some e ∈
Ē}, and E(V̄ ) = {e ∈ E : ∃v ∈ V̄ , v ∈ e}. We write V (e) for V ({e}) and
E(v) for E({v}). Let nV (G) and nE(G) denote the numbers of vertices and
edges in G, respectively. Whenever no confusion arises we write nV and nE
instead of nV (G) and nE(G), respectively.
Now, we formally define a network game.
Definition 5.5. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with no isolated
vertices. Fix integers α and δ with α, δ ≥ 1. A network game Γα,δ(G) =
〈N ,S〉 on G is defined as follows:
• N = NA ∪ND is the set of players, where NA and ND are disjoint and
NA is a finite set of attackers ai, where 1 ≤ i ≤ α
ND is a finite set of defenders dj, where 1 ≤ j ≤ δ
• S = Eα × V δ is the strategy set of Γα,δ(G)
An element 〈e1, ..., eα, v1, ..., vδ〉 of S is also called a profile of the game,
and ei, vj strategies of ai, dj, respectively. Note that all players make their
choice simultaneously. Now fix a profile s = 〈e1, ..., eα, v1, ..., vδ〉 of the game
Γα,δ(G). We define a profit (income) of the players as follows.
• The individual profit of attacker ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ α, is given by
Ps(ai) =
0 if vj ∈ ei for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ1 if vj /∈ ei for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ
In other words, attacker ai receives 0 if it is caught by a defender dj,
and 1 otherwise.
• The individual profit of defender dj, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, is given by
Ps(dj) = |{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ α, vj ∈ ei}|
representing the number of attackers captured by dj.
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In this section, we present a graph theoretic characterization of pure Nash
equilibrium. We next study in greater detail by investigate the complexity
of computing (pure) Nash equilibria.
5.4 Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
Definition 5.6. A profile s is a Nash equilibrium if for any player r ∈ N ,
Ps(r) ≥ Ps̄(r) for any profile s̄ which differs from s only on the strategy of
r.
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium no player can improve his individual
profit by changing his strategy unilaterally.
Before we proceed to the theorem, we define the following sets:
As = {e ∈ E : ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ α, where e = ei},
Ds = {v ∈ V : ∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ such that v = vj},
where s = 〈e1, ..., eα, v1, ..., vδ〉.
First, we see a following theorem stating the existence of pure Nash equi-
libria corresponding to set A and D defined previously.
Theorem 5.1. The game Γα,δ(G) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if there
exist D ⊂ V and A ⊂ E such that
1. |D| ≤ δ and |A| ≤ α
2. D is a vertex cover of G
3. ∀v ∈ D, |A ∩ E(v)| = maxv̄∈V |A ∩ E(v̄)|.
Proof. Suppose Γα,δ(G) has a Nash equilibrium, say s. Let A = As and
D = Ds. Then, (1) is straightforward. To prove (2), suppose to the contrary
that there exists ē ∈ E such that v /∈ ē for all v ∈ D. Then, any attacker
can receive 1 by switching to ē. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, each attacker
must already get 1, which means that all defenders receive 0. However, any
defender can get at least 1 by switching to a vertex incident to an attacked
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edge, which contradicts the assumption that s is Nash equilibrium. Similarly
if (3) does not hold, there would be a vj ∈ D and v̄ such that |A ∩ E(vj)| <
|A ∩ E(v̄)|. Thus, defender j would find it beneficial to change his choice
from vj to v̄, which contradicts the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose there exist A and D satisfying condition (1), (2)
and (3). By (1), let s be a profile so that each element of A (resp. D) is
chosen by at least one attacker (resp. defender). By (2), no matter how an
attacker changes his strategy, he will always get 0. Thus, an attacker has
no incentive to change his strategy. By (3), if a defender changes his choice,
it won’t increase his profit, since the number of protected edges is already
maximum.
Theorem 5.2. If α is the size of a maximum matching in G and δ = 2α,
then the game Γα,δ(G) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let A be a maximum matching in G and D be the set of vertices
incident to an edge in A. Then obviously conditions (1) and (3) of Theorem
5.1 hold. For (2), assume that there were ē ∈ E such that v /∈ ē for all
v ∈ D. Then, A∪ {ē} would be also a matching, which contradicts with the
maximality of A.
In general, it is difficult to determine whether a network game has a Nash
equilibrium. The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is related to the
problem of finding a maximum matching in a graph, which is also known to
be computationally hard to treat. But for a bipartite graph, such a problem
is tractable. Moreover, bipartite graphs have many nice properties studied in
the past research. For instance, König’s theorem states that, in a bipartite
graph, the size of a minimum vertex cover is equal to the size of a maximum
matching, which in fact leads to a result that a minimum vertex cover and
a maximum independent set can be found in polynomial time for a bipartite
graph.
Definition 5.7. The graph G is bipartite if V = V0 ∪ V1 for some disjoint
vertex sets V0,V1 ⊆ V so that for each edge (u, v) ∈ E, u ∈ V0 and v ∈ V1
(or u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V0).
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Theorem 5.3. For a bipartite graph G, the game Γα,δ(G) has a Nash equi-
librium if and only if α, δ ≥ m, where m is the size of a maximum matching
in G.
Proof. The proof easily follows from König’s duality theorem. For a bipartite
graph G, if M is a maximum matching and CminV is a minimum vertex cover,
then ∀e ∈M,∃!v ∈ CminV such that v ∈ e.On the other hand, ∀v ∈ CminV ,∃e ∈
M such that v ∈ e. So, A = M,D = CminV satisfy the three conditions of
Theorem 5.1. The other direction is similar.
Theorem 5.4. For a bipartite graph G, the existence of pure Nash equilib-
rium on Γα,δ(G) can be determined in O(
√
nV nE).
Proof. The proof is based on an augmenting path algorithm (see [35]). The
overall complexity of finding a maximum matching by such an algorithm is
O(nV nE). This can be improved to O(
√
nV nE) by augmenting along several
augmenting paths simultaneously.
In sum, Theorem 5.3 reduces the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
to that of finding a maximal matching in the case of a bipartite graph. Then,
Theorem 5.4 shows that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium on a bi-
partite graph can be determined in almost linear time by computing an
augmenting path through the graph.
Chapter 6
Mixed Nash Equilibria
In this chapter, we first define a mixed strategy for our network game, and
investigate the existence conditions of a mixed Nash equilibrium by applying
some results in the previous chapter.
6.1 Characterizations of Mixed
Nash Equilibria
We start with basic notations and definitions with respect to this game.
6.1.1 Mixed strategies
A mixed strategy for an attacker (resp. defender) is a probability distribution
over edges (resp. vertices) of G. Formally, a mixed strategy is define as
follows.
Definition 6.1. For each i ≤ α, a (mixed) strategy of attacker ai is any
function




Similarly, for each j ≤ δ, a mixed strategy for defender dj is any function
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So, σi(e) is the probability that attacker ai chooses edge e and τj(v)
is the probability that defender dj chooses vertex v. A mixed profile s =
〈σ1, ..., σα, τ1, ..., τδ〉 is a collection of mixed strategies, one for each player.
The support of a player r ∈ N in a profile s, denoted by Ss(r), is the set of










We say that s is uniform if for any i,
Ss(ai) = Ss(A) and σi(e) =
1
|Ss(A)|
for e ∈ Ss(A)
and for any j,
Ss(dj) = Ss(D) and τj(v) =
1
|Ss(D)|
for v ∈ Ss(D).
Now, fix a mixed profile s. For an edge e ∈ E, let Save(e) denote the event
that at least one end v ∈ e is protected by a defender in s. For a vertex
v ∈ V , let Save(v) denote the event that at least one defender protects the






τj(v) · τk(v) +
∑
j 6=k,k 6=l,j 6=l
τj(v) · τk(v) · τl(v)− · · · .
Thus for e = (u, v), the probability of Save(e), denoted by πs(Save(e)), is
defined as follows:
πs(Save(e)) = πs(Save(u)) + πs(Save(v))− πs(Save(u))πs(Save(v)).
CHAPTER 6. MIXED NASH EQUILIBRIA 48
6.1.2 Expected profits
A mixed profile s induces an expected individual profit Ps(r) for each player
r ∈ N , which is the expectation, according to s, of its corresponding indi-
vidual profit. We proceed to define the expected profit for each player.


















σi(e) · (1− πs(Save(e))).
Definition 6.2. A mixed profile s is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for each
player r ∈ N , it maximizes Ps over all profiles s̄ that differ from s only with
respect to the mixed strategy of player r.
Intuitively, no player can gain more by a unilateral change of his strategy.
We proceed to study the characterization of a mixed Nash equilibrium.
6.1.3 Properties of mixed Nash equilibria
In this section, we show that two covering properties, that is, the existence
of a vertex cover and an edge cover, characterize a necessary condition for
mixed Nash equilibria. In fact, we show that the supports of defenders and
attackers are a vertex cover and an edge cover of the graph, respectively.
Theorem 6.1. In any mixed Nash equilibrium s of Γα,δ(G), Ss(D) is a vertex
cover of G.
Proof. Assume Ss(D) is not a vertex cover. Let ENC be a nonempty set of
edges of G not covered by Ss(D). Then, any attacker ai ∈ NA, by setting
Ss(ai) ⊆ ENC , cannot be caught by a defender. That is, any attacker is not
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caught by a defender according to s, since it is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
This implies that for any j, Ps(dj) = 0, which contradicts with the property
of a mixed Nash equilibrium since a defender can choose a vertex incident to
an attacked edge.
Theorem 6.2. In any mixed Nash equilibrium s of Γα,δ(G), Ss(A) is an
edge cover of the subgraph of G obtained by restricting to Ss(D).
Proof. Assume the contrary, and let v ∈ Ss(D) such that v is not covered by
Ss(A). Since v ∈ Ss(D), there is a defender dj who chooses v with positive
probability. Now, if he chooses a vertex incident to an attacked edge with the
same probability instead of v, he can increase his profit, which is impossible
in a mixed Nash equilibrium.
The following characterization is useful for checking whether or not it is
a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6.3. Given a graph G, a mixed profile s is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if:













Proof. It is easy to see from the definition of a mixed Nash equilibrium and
the expected profit.
Remark 2. Given a profile s, the condition that Ss(A) and Ss(D) are an
edge cover and vertex cover respectively, does not necessarily imply that s is
a Nash equilibrium.







Figure 6.1: An illustration of the example
For example, let G = {{v0, v1, v2}, {e0, e1}} where e0 = (v0, v1) and e1 =
(v1, v2). Let α = δ = 1, and also s = 〈σ1, τ1〉 such that σ1(e0) = 0.9,
σ1(e1) = 0.1 and τ1(v0) = 0.9, τ1(v1) = 0, τ1(v2) = 0.1. Then, clearly










Hence, s is not a Nash equilibrium by Proposition 6.3.
6.2 Perfect Covering Profiles
In this section, we introduce a new notion, called a perfect covering profile,
and show it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in a bipartite graph. These characterizations enable an almost linear time
algorithm to compute a perfect Nash equilibrium on a bipartite graph with
a given independent vertex cover and a maximal matching.
Definition 6.3. A mixed profile s = (σ1, ..., σα, τ1, ..., τδ) is said to be a per-
fect covering profile if it is uniform (see Remark 3) and satisfies the following
conditions.
1. Ss(D) is an independent vertex cover.
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2. Ss(A) is a perfect matching.
Remark 3 (cf. Section 6.1.1). Recall that if s is uniform, then σi(e) = σi′(e
′)
for any e, e′ ∈ Ss(A) and τj(v) = τj′(v′) for any v, v′ ∈ Ss(D).
Lemma 6.4. In a bipartite graph, a perfect covering profile is a mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. We shall use Proposition 6.3 to prove this lemma. We first show
condition (1). Fix j ≤ δ and v ∈ Ss(dj), and take v̄ ∈ V arbitrary. Since
Ss(A) is a perfect matching, for any w ∈ V , there is exactly one ew ∈ Ss(A)























To show that condition (2) holds, fix i ≤ α, e ∈ Ss(ai) and take ē ∈ E
arbitrary. Since Ss(D) is an independent set and vertex cover, for any f ∈ E,
















τj(vē) · τk(vē) + · · ·
= πs(Save(vē))
= πs(Save(ē))
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By Proposition 6.3, it follows that s is a Nash equilibrium.
6.2.1 Perfect Nash equilibria
A perfect covering profile is called a perfect Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash
equilibrium. A subgraph of G is said to be an odd cycle if it is a cycle with
an odd number of vertices. Similarly for an even cycle with an even number
of vertices. Then, we can easily show the following fact.
Remark 4. If G has a perfect matching and no odd cycle, then G has an
independent vertex cover.
The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a
game Γα,δ(G) to have a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.5. The game Γα,δ(G) has a perfect Nash equilibria if and only
if G has a perfect matching and no odd cycle.
Proof. Suppose first that Γα,δ(G) has a perfect Nash equilibrium, say s. By
definition, Ss(D) is an independent vertex cover, which imply V \ Ss(D)
is independent as well. Suppose that G had an odd cycle Codd. Then, there
would be an edge e contained in Codd with endpoints both in Ss(D) or both in
V \Ss(D), which is a contradiction. By definition, G has a perfect matching.
Conversely, assume G has a perfect matching and no odd cycle. By Remark
4, G has an independent vertex cover. Since now we have a perfect matching
M and an independent vertex cover ICV , we construct a perfect covering
profile s = (...σi..., ...τj...) as follows:
σi(e) =
 1|M | if e ∈M0 if otherwise






if v ∈ ICV
0 if otherwise
where M := Ss(A) and ICV := Ss(D). Clearly, a perfect covering profile s
is a mixed Nash equilibrium, as needed. Therefore, the game Γα,δ(G) has a
perfect Nash equilibrium.
For a subset U ⊆ V of a graph G, denote NG(U) = {v | (u, v) ∈
E for some u ∈ U}, the neighbour set of U in G. If G is (V0, V1)-bipartite,
and U ⊆ V0, then NG(U) ⊆ V1. The graph G is a V0-Expander graph if for
each set U ⊆ V0, |U | ≤ |NG(U)|. The degree of a vertex v is the number
|E(v)| of edges at v, this is equal to the number of neighbours of v. If all the
vertices of G have the same degree k, then G is k-regular, or simply regular.
Theorem 6.6 (Hall’s Theorem [21]). Let G be a bipartite graph with bipar-
tition (V0, V1). Then, G contains a matching M that matches all the vertices
in V0 if and only if |NG(U)| ≥ |U | for all U ⊆ V0.
Corollary 6.7. If G is a k-regular bipartite graph with k > 0, then the game
Γα,δ(G) has a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let G be a k-regular bipartite graph (V0 ∪ V1;E). Thus, we have
k|V0| = nE = k|V1| by regularity, and hence |V0| = |V1| since k > 0. Now,
let U ⊆ V0. Let E0 = {e ∈ E : v ∈ e, for some v ∈ U} and E1 =
{e ∈ E : v ∈ e, for some v ∈ NG(U)}. Clearly, E0 ⊆ E1. Therefore,
k|NG(U)| = |E1| ≥ |E0| = k|U |, and so |NG(U)| ≥ |U |. By Theorem 6.6, G
has a matching M that matches every vertex in V0. Since |V0| = |V1|, this
matching is necessarily perfect. By Theorem 6.5, G admits a perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Note that the example for Remark 2 is bipartite but not regular, and that
it has an independent vertex cover but no perfect matching.
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6.2.2 Computing a Nash equilibrium
Theorem 6.8. For a bipartite graph G, it can be computed in O(
√
nV nE)




Proof. Define Ss(A) := M and Ss(D) := ICV such that
σi(e) =





Clearly, s is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the problem of deciding the game
Γα,δ(G) has a perfect Nash equilibrium is equivalent to finding a maximum
matchingM . The algorithmic problem of finding such a matching thus can be






So far, we have only discussed network games where all the attackers and
defenders make individual decisions simultaneously. In this chapter, we start
considering a new game where a pair of an attacker and a defender executes a
simultaneous game in turn. Specifically, we generalize the previous network
game to a new game, called an asynchronous game, which consists of sequen-
tial executions of simultaneous games with two players. Or we may think
that there is exactly one attacker and one defender, who repeatedly execute
simultaneous games. As in previous games, the attacker aims to damage the
network by attacking an edge, and the defender aims to protect the network
by choosing a vertex.
The important characteristic of our new game is that after one round of
the game, the base graph may be reduced by removing an edge damaged
by the attack but not (adjacent to a vertex) protected in the round. Then,
the final goal of the attacker is to vanish the graph as quickly as possible,
while that of the opponent is to keep it as long as possible. Actually, an
asynchronous game can be viewed as a special Blackwell game [3]. In 1998,
Martin proved that a Blackwell game with Borel payoff is determinate, i.e.,
it has a stable solution [24]. Thus, our game with a suitable payoff is also
determinate and each player has a stable strategy. However, we show this by
55
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reducing it to a finite game without referring to the Blackwell determinacy.
In this work, our final aim is to study the dynamism of attack-protection
effects in the network. In other words, we consider a new game where a syn-
chronous game is executed repeatedly (unbounded many times). Although
there may be many possible variations of this games, we are particularly
interested in our formulation. Actually, to consider iterations of old simulta-
neous games, we have thought it more natural that an edge is to be attacked
and a vertex protected rather than the opposite. In a previous game, a hub
node is easier to avoid damage since it has many edges for protection, but
once it is damaged, the network might have a terminal breakdown. Con-
trastively, in our new game, even if a trunk edge is damaged, another rooting
could take its role, and thus the network could maintain major functions
after the effective attack. Since we have just started this line of research,
we must leave detailed analysis of the variations of this game to the future
study.
We would like to point out some important facts. First of all, our new
game can be viewed as a special Blackwell game [3]. Blackwell games are
infinite games of imperfect information, which is introduced by D. Blackwell
in 1969. It has been shown in the standard set theory that in any Blackwell
game with a Borel payoff, the players have optimal strategy, namely the game
is determinate. Thus, our game (with a suitable payoff) is also determinate,
and each player has a stable strategy so that the estimation of the duration
of the game is determined.
The Blackwell game is defined as follows:
Definition 7.1 (Blackwell Games). Let X and Y be two finite nonempty
sets, and put W = (X×Y )N. Let f : W → R be a bounded Borel-measurable
function. The Blackwell game Γ(f) with payoff function f is the two-person
zero-sum infinite game of imperfect information played as follows:
• Player I selects an element x1 ∈ X, and simultaneously, Player II selects
an element y1 ∈ Y . Then both players are told z1 = (x1, y1), and the
game has reached position (z1). Then,
• Player I selects x2 ∈ X, and simultaneously, Player II selects y2 ∈ Y .
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Then, both players are told z2 = (x2, y2), and the game is at position
(z1, z2).
Then both players simultaneously selects x3 ∈ X and y3 ∈ Y, etc. Thus they
produce a play w = (z1, z2, ...). Finally, Player II pays Player I the amount
f(w), ending the game.
7.2 Definition of Asynchronous Games
We are ready to define an asynchronous game. First of all, we define partial
plays and corresponding sequences of subgraphs. Let G = (V,E) be an undi-
rected graph. The set P ⊂ (E × V )<N of partial plays is defined recursively
as follows. Put the empty sequence λ ∈ P and Eλ = E and Vλ = V . Now
assume that η ∈ P , and Eη ⊂ E and Vη ⊂ V have been defined. We put
ρ := η_〈(e, v)〉 into P , if e ∈ Eη and v ∈ Vη. Then, we define
Eρ :=
Eη if v ∈ eEη − {e} if v /∈ e
Vρ := V (Eρ).
Finally, let [P ] = {w ∈ (E×V )N : each finite initial segment of w belongs to P}.
A payoff function needs to be defined on [P ]. But it is often regarded as a
function on W = (E × V )N by setting f(w) = 0 for w ∈ W − [P ].
Definition 7.2. Let f : W → R be a payoff function. An asynchronous game
Γ(G; f) with payoff function f is an infinite game of imperfect information
played as follows: Attacker a selects an element e1 ∈ E and simultaneously
defender d chooses an element v1 ∈ V . Then both the players are told
z1 = (e
1, v1). Next, the attacker selects e2 ∈ E, and simultaneously the
defender selects v2 ∈ V , and z2 = (e2, v2), etc. In this manner they produce
an infinite sequence w = (z1, z2, ...) ∈ (E × V )N. Finally, the defender pays
the attacker the amount f(w), ending the game.
CHAPTER 7. AN ASYNCHRONOUS GAME 58
7.2.1 Strategies and expected profits
A mixed strategy in an asynchronous game is defined as follows.
Definition 7.3. A mixed strategy for attacker a in Γ(G; f) is a function
σ∗ assigning to each position ρ a probability distribution on Eρ, that is,
σ∗ : P → [0, 1]E satisfying
∑
e∈Eρ σ
∗(ρ)(e) = 1. Similarly, a mixed strategy




Definition 7.4. Let σ∗ and τ ∗ be strategies for the attacker and the defender










where [ρ] = {w ∈ W : ρ is an initial segment of w} and ρ|n is an initial
segment of ρ with the length n.
Given a pair of mixed strategies s = (σ∗, τ ∗), the expected profit of the





7.2.2 Values and optimal strategies
The value of a strategy σ∗ for the attacker in Γ(G; f) is the expected income
the attacker can guarantee if they plays according to σ∗. Similarly, the value
of a strategy τ ∗ for the defender in Γ(G; f) is the amount to which the
defender can restrict the attacker’s profit if he plays according to τ ∗, that is,
valσ∗(Γ(G; f)) = inf
τ∗
Ps(Γ(G; f)),
valτ∗(Γ(G; f)) = sup
σ∗
Ps(Γ(G; f)).
Definition 7.5. The lower value of Γ(G; f) is the smallest upper bound on
the income that the attacker can guarantee. Similarly, the upper value of
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Γ(G; f) is the largest lower bound on the restrictions the defender can put
on the attacker’s income, that is,










If val↑(Γ(G; f)) = val↓(Γ(G; f)), then Γ(G; f) is called determined.
Definition 7.6. A strategy σ∗ for the attacker in Γ(G; f) is optimal if
valσ∗(Γ(G; f)) = val↓(Γ(G; f)), and similarly, a strategy τ
∗ for the defender
in Γ(G; f) is optimal if valτ∗(Γ(G; f)) = val↑(Γ(G; f)).
7.3 One-Round Games
We are going to analyze our asynchronous game with a concrete payoff. Since
the objective of the attacker is to vanish the graph as quickly as possible, his
strategy at each round can not be evaluated simply by the expected numbers
of edges damaged by it. So, we start with the following one-round game.
Given a finite graph G and a state evaluation f : {G′ : G′ is a proper
subgraph of G} → R, we define a one-round game Γ(G; f). A mixed strat-
egy σ for attacker is a probability distribution over E. Similarly for defender,
a mixed strategy τ is a probability distribution over V . So, σ(e) is the proba-
bility that attacker a chooses edge e and τ(v) is the probability that defender
d chooses vertex v. We define a function h : E × V → {subgraphs of G} by
h(e, v) :=
G if v ∈ eG(E \ {e}) if v /∈ e
Now, we define the expected profit of the game Γ(G; f).
Definition 7.7. Let s = (σ, τ) be a pair of mixed strategies. The expected

















To understand the above definition, suppose that the attacker chooses
edge e and the defender chooses vertex v. If v is not adjacent to e, the attack
is successful and so one point is given to the attacker. Since the new round
starts with the graph h(e, v), it follows that the attacker receives 1+f(h(e, v))
in this case. If v is adjacent to e, the next round starts with the same graph,
but the expected profit is evaluated as cPs(Γ(G; f)) with the delay constant
c. For simplicity, we will assume c = 1
2
from now on, though any c ∈ (0, 1)
works as the same.
Now we investigate the existence of a mixed Nash equilibria in the one-
round game. The theorem is stated as follows.
Theorem 7.1. Given a graphG and function f : {G′ $ G : G′ a subgraph} →
R. Then, the one-round game Γ(G; f) is determined with a stable solution.
The proof follows from a combination of the mini-max theorem and
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (or the intermediate value theorem for this
particular case). First of all, we recall Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Theorem 7.2 (Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem). Let S be a subset of some
space Rn that is convex and compact, and let φ be a continuous function
from S to S. Then, φ has at least one fixed point, that is, a point s in S
such that φ(s) = s.
Brouwer’s theorem has been generalized in numerous ways, e.g., Schauder’s
and Tychonoff’s fixed point theorems. Kakutani also proposed a multifunc-
tion analogue to Brouwer’s theorem, and then show that this generalized
theorem implies the famous von Neumann’s mini-max theorem.
Theorem 7.3 (Mini-Max Theorem). Let K,L be two bounded closed convex
sets in Rm,Rn. Let f(x, y) be a continuous real function on K×L such that
for any x0 ∈ K and α ∈ R, {y ∈ L : f(x0, y) ≤ α} is convex, and for any
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Proof of the Theorem 7.1. Suppose f : {G′ $ G} → R, and f(G) =
x ∈ R (for the next round with the same G) are given. The expected profit
according to a profile (σ, τ) is following:
P (σ, τ, x) :=
∑
v/∈e
















P (σ, τ, x)
for all x ∈ R. Note that the set of strategy σ’s (similar for τ ’s) is bounded
closed convex, and so it is easy to see that M(x) = maxσ minτ P (σ, τ, x) is a
continuous function. Now put m = 1 + max f . Clearly, M : [0,m]→ [0,m].
So it has a fixed point x̂. Then M(x̂) serves as a stable solution.
Note that in the above proof, we cannot use the second formula of the ex-
pected profit in Definition 7.7, since the conditions of the mini-max theorem
do not hold for that formula.
7.4 Games with a Natural Payoff Function
Now, we are going to define a function f : W → R, which plays the role
of a natural payoff for the attacker of our asynchronous game. Recall that
[P ] ⊆ W is defined to be the set of infinite sequences whose initial segments
are all included in P . For w = ((e1, v1), (e2, v2), (e3, v3), ...) ∈ [P ], we set
bi(w) :=
0 if vi ∈ ei,1 if vi /∈ ei.







Thus f(w) does not only evaluate the number of damaged edges through w,
but also evaluate the promptness of attacks. Finally we have,
Theorem 7.4. The asynchronous game Γ(G; f) is determined.
Proof. We show the existence of a stable solution in the game without refer-
ring to the Blackwell determinacy. We call a subgraph G′ of G a terminal
graph if the graph can not be reduced to a smaller graph whatever the play-
ers play on it. Let G0 be the set of terminal graphs of G. Now consider a
subgraph G′ of G, which is reduced to a terminal graph or unchanged after
a one-round game on G′ is executed. By assigning 0 to each terminal graph,
we can compute the profit or the state value of this graph by Theorem 7.1.
We define G1 to be the set of such subgraphs of G. Next consider a subgraph
G′′ of G which is either reduced to a graph in G0 ∪ G1, or unchanged in a
one-round game. By assigning 0 to each terminal graph, and to a graph G′
in G1, its state value, we can compute the state value of the new graph by
Theorem 7.1. By continuing this process (at most nE(G) times), we finally
obtain the profit of the attacker for G.
We should notice that in the above proof, the infinite game Γ(G; f) is
reduced to a finite-round game in a constructive way.
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